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I.       Introduction 
 
           Wage differences constitute a central explanation for the increasing business 
practice of international outsourcing across industries (see e.g. Stefanova (2006) 
concerning the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing). It is important to mention that 
Amiti and Wei (2005) emphasize the big difference in labor costs as the main 
explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both manufacturing and 
services to countries with low labor costs. Of course one reason for these wage gaps 
is the difference of labor market institutions. In most western European countries 
the wage is still determined by bargaining between firms and trade unions, but e.g. 
in eastern European or Asian countries there is either no wage bargaining or trade 
unions are much weaker.  
Since Western European firms have the opportunity to buy foreign 
intermediate goods after knowing the domestic wage levels and so the marginal 
production cost, this will affect the domestic wage formation process for both types 
of workers. To induce to abstain from external procurement of intermediate goods, 
Western European firms need lower marginal cost. Since both wages for skilled and 
unskilled affect the marginal production cost, there are two components to reduce 
marginal cost. If lower wages are not possible, firms have to raise their 
productivity. One channel to increase productivity is to stimulate workers’ effort. 
The firm may introduce a profit sharing scheme that lets workers participate in the 
firm’s success. The implementation of profit sharing will induce incentives to 
increase effort and thus productivity for given wage levels.  
Empirical studies show that profit sharing is an important phenomenon in 
many OECD countries.1 However, only high skilled workers, such as managers, 
often realize profit sharing as a part of their income. So they participate in the 
firm’s success, which is positively influenced by their effort. However, this 
dampens the advantage of domestic production and increases outsourcing activities. 
As profit sharing is now commonly incorporated in the compensation schemes and 
international outsourcing has recently increased, e.g. in Western EU-countries and 
                                               
1       Pendleton et al. (2001) have presented detailed data on profit sharing schemes in 14 OECD 
countries. For further evidence regarding the incidence of profit sharing, see also Estrin et al. 
(1997) and Conyon and Freeman (2004). 
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in the United States, it is important to study the implications of profit sharing and 
wage bargaining in the presence of outsourcing. 
Concerning the analysis of the effect of outsourcing on compensation  
schemes under wage bargaining there are two focuses in the literature, the cases of 
committed outsourcing and flexible outsourcing. While in the committed case, 
outsourcing takes place before wage bargaining2, but in the flexible case 
outsourcing is decided after wage bargaining. Our focus in this paper is to assume 
that outsourcing is strategic, i.e. determined before domestic labour demand and 
wage formation.3  
Concerning the effect of profit sharing, Koskela and Stenbacka (2006) have 
studied the differences between committed and flexible profit sharing in terms of 
wage formation but in the absence of outsourcing. We extend the literature of 
strategic outsourcing by implementing profit sharing as a part of the compensation 
scheme. The idea behind the implementation of profit sharing is that this will 
induce incentives to increase effort and so productivity for given wage level. Profit 
sharing will also affect the wage formation, what could lead to a lower base wage 
since a part of the former wage level is substituted by profit income. Since only the 
base wage enters marginal cost, in this case outsourcing will decrease.  
 In contrast to Koskela and König (2009), in this paper we combine profit 
sharing and outsourcing if the wage for worker is decided the labor union, but effort 
is decided by the worker. In this context we analyze the following questions 
associated with strategic outsourcing and committed profit sharing under imperfect 
domestic labor market in the case when profit sharing affects effort. First, what is 
the relationship between wage formation, profit sharing and outsourcing under 
strategic outsourcing? Second, will the firm implement the strategic profit sharing 
scheme if homogenous workers decide individually about effort provision? Third, 
                                               
2  See e.g. Perry (1997) for an overview about the relationship between outsourcing and wage 
bargaining. Also e.g. Danthine and Hunt (1994), Zhao (2001), Chen et al. (2004), Buehler and 
Haucap (2006) and Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) have analyzed strategic outsourcing issue 
in the absence of profit sharing. Holcomb and Hitt (2007) have studied strategic outsourcing 
by integrating transaction-based cost theory (TCT) and resource-based view (RBV) logics 
also in the absence of profit sharing.   
3          Chen et al. (2004) have analyzed strategic incentive for international outsourcing by focusing 
further trade liberalization, but in the absence of profit sharing.    
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are the determinants of committed profit sharing decided before wage formation 
different relative to flexible outsourcing decided after wage formation?   
We find that profit income and wage have an individual effort-augmenting 
effect and thus increase productivity and wage elasticity of effort  depends on the 
parameter  of  disutility  of  effort  so  that  it  can  be smaller, equal to, or higher than 
one.  Moreover, in the case of wage elasticity of effort being smaller than one, 
higher wage and higher outsourcing will increase the total wage elasticity of labor 
demand, while higher profit sharing will decrease the total wage elasticity of labor 
demand. In the presence of strategic outsourcing when the wage elasticity of effort 
is smaller than one, higher outsourcing decreases wage formation, whereas higher 
profit  sharing  will  have  an  ambiguous  effect  on  wage  formation  and  when  profit  
sharing elasticity of labor demand is smaller than one. When the wage elasticity of 
effort  is  one,  higher  outsourcing  decreases  wage  formation,  whereas  higher  profit  
sharing will have a negative effect on wage formation when profit sharing elasticity 
of labor demand is smaller than one. For individual effort provision, the firm 
optimally implements a committed profit sharing scheme and strategic outsourcing 
is higher than flexible outsourcing when wage elasticity of effort is smaller than 
one. Finally when the elasticity of effort in terms of wage is only one optimal 
committed outsourcing is the same as in the case of flexible outsourcing and higher 
(lower) outsourcing due to lower (higher) outsourcing cost will have a negative 
(positive) effect of the firm committed profit sharing.  
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the time sequences of decisions 
in terms of outsourcing, employment, effort wage formation and profit sharing. 
Also labor demand and employee effort are presented. Section III investigates the 
wage formation by monopoly labor union with committed profit sharing and 
strategic outsourcing and Section IV studies optimal committed profit sharing and 
strategic outsourcing. Finally, we present conclusions in section V.     
 
II.   The  Basic  Framework  and  Optimal  Labor  Demand  and  
Individual Employee Effort 
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We assume that output depends not only on domestic labor and international 
outsourcing, but also on the effort by workers, i.e. the workers’ productivity. This 
lies in conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis.4 We analyze the following 
timing decision, which captures the idea that the representative firm is strategic to 
decide about the amount of outsourcing before wage determination and domestic 
labor demand, and also commits to profit sharing before wage determination. After 
the firm has decided about profit sharing and outsourcing, the monopoly trade union 
sets the wage subject to labor demand and effort determination. If the wage, profit 
share level and outsourcing are known, the representative worker decides on effort 
provision. We summarize these timing decisions in Figure 1 and analyze these in 
the following sections. The decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward 
induction. 
 
Figure 1:  Time sequences of decisions in terms of outsourcing, employment, effort, 
wage formation and profit sharing  
 
       Strategic outsourcing and committed profit sharing: 
 
Stage 1                       Stage 2                      Stage 3               
 
 
    outsourcing M and     wage formation w     labor demand L  and 
 profit sharing  ?                                            effort determination e   
      
 
 First we characterize the optimal labor demand by the representative firm 
and the effort by the representative worker by taking profit sharing, outsourcing and 
wage formation as given in earlier stages. The concave production function in terms 
of decreasing returns to scale with respect to effective labor and outsourcing is 
presented 
? ? ? ??? MLeMLeF ??
1, ,  with 10 ???  ,                         (1) 
where the price of the output is normalized to unity, L  is  the amount of domestic 
labor and M  the firm’s labor input acquired from external suppliers through 
                                               
4      See e.g. the book edited by Akerlof and Yellen (1986), which includes the main initial 
efficiency wage papers about (i) shirking models, (ii) labor turnover models, (iii) adverse 
selection models and (iv) sociological models. 
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outsourcing as give here. The parameter e  describes the total average effort of the 
firm’s worker, where the average effort is defined as ?
?
?
L
i
ieL
e
1
1 , so that the impact 
of provision of an additional unit of effort by a single worker is 
Le
e
i
1??
? .5  As one 
can see from equation (1), we assume that domestic effective labor, Le ,   and  
outsourcing, M , are perfect substitutes.  
 
II.1.     Domestic Labor Demand 
 
  The firm decides on domestic labor to maximize the profit function 
 
? ? ? ? ?MfwLMLeMax
L
???? ???
1
,
.                                   (2) 
 
by  taking  the  average  effort,  e , the negotiated wage, w ,  profit sharing, ? , and 
outsourcing, M , as given. For the cost of outsourcing, we assume there are some 
other costs associated with outsourcing such as the price of the intermediate goods. 
Such costs could be costs for transport, which are exponential increasing with 
higher outsourcing. To allow for an exponential cost increase, we model a quadratic 
cost function, ? ? 2
2
1 cMMf ?  with ? ? 0' ?Mf  and ? ? 0'' ?Mf .               
The first-order condition of (2) is ? ? 01 ????? ? wMLeeL ??  can be 
expressed as  
                     
e
MewL ?? ??? ?
?
? 11
1
,                                                               (3) 
                                                                                                      
In the case of perfect substitutability domestic labor demand is a negative function 
of both wage and the amount of outsourcing and a positive function of effort. 
                                               
5  A specification, which is also common in the literature, describes effort as the fraction of 
working hours that the worker actually works. Since the number of working hours is 
normalized to 1, the choice of an individual is ? ?1;0?ie  and thus ? ?ie?1  characterizes the 
fraction of time spent shirking. Following this Le  is the whole actual working time. 
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Higher outsourcing will decrease domestic labor demand, which lies in conformity 
with empirics.6 However, labor demand does not directly depend on profit sharing, 
which also lies in conformity with empirical evidence.7 
In the presence of outsourcing the direct own wage elasticity of the labor, 
L
w
w
L
w ?
???? , and the effort elasticity of the labor , 
L
e
e
L
e ?
??? ,  can  be  written  as  
follows 
  1)1(
1
1 ???? Le
M
w ?? ,                                                                (4a) 
  01
1
1
1
??????? we Le
M ???
?? .                                               (4b) 
 
II.2.     Individual Employee Effort  
           
  By following the literature we assume for the employed worker that the 
utility function is additively separable in income and effort, where the utility 
depends positively on the wage and profit income and negatively on the disutility of 
effort. The employed worker receives an income of y , which includes both the 
wage w  and the profit income 
L
??  so that the overall remuneration can be written 
as 
L
wy ???? . The idea behind this is that the workers are assumed a team. The 
whole  team gets  the  profit  share  ?? ? , what is distributed equally to the member. 
However, to get the profit income, it causes effort provision of a worker. Since 
worker dislikes effort provision, it is associated with a disutility, which can be 
describe by )(eg , where ? ? ?? /1eeg ??  is  assumed  to  be  a  convex  function  with  
10 ?? ?  so that ? ? ? ? 0' 1/1 ?? ??eeg  and ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? 01/1'' 2/1 ??? ??? eeg .  
Since the profit is equally distributed, every (homogenous) worker gets the 
same per capita profit income, but he/she realizes the individual disutility for 
providing a certain effort level. Thus there is space for a free-rider behavior by the 
single worker, which means that there is an incentive for shirking. The biggest 
                                               
6         See e.g. Görg and Hanley (2005). 
7         See e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997). 
 7
problem of firm’s owner is to solve this moral hazard problem and to verify the 
individual effort.8 However, in the discussion of the free-rider problem interaction 
of the group member and peer pressure are often neglected. Due to the 
implementation of profit sharing there are incentives in the group to internalize the 
externalities of free-riding and avoiding shirking, since it set some incentive to 
observe each other and interact.9 This can build up a peer pressure to provide the 
individual effort resulting from individual utility maximization and eliminate the 
moral hazard problem concerning the free-rider behavior. Following Kandel and 
Lazear (1992), we motivate this peer pressure as a social group norm. Due to the 
observation, the individual fells shame or guilty if the individual effort is below this 
norm, since it lowers the income for each of the team member. However, also an 
effort above the norm will decrease the individual utility, since now the other team 
member  will  feel  shame.  Thus  any  deviation  from  the  norm  will  lead  to  a  utility  
loss. Therefore, the peer pressure function can be written simply as ? ? ? ?2~ ii eeeP ?? , 
where e~  is  the  social  norm and  defined  as  the  average  effort  of  all  other  worker  
than i .10   
From  this  framework  we  can  write  the  utility  of  a  single  employed  
individual in (5a) and of an unemployed individual in (5b)  
 
? ?2/1
*
~ eee
L
wv ????? ???? ,                                                       (5a) 
bv ? .                            (5b) 
 
                                               
8  In the literature of efficiency wage models this is solved with paying a higher wage than the 
competitive level, see Salop (1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and the book edited by 
Akerlof and Yellen (1986), which includes as the standard efficiency wage models, i.e. 
shirking models, labour turnover models, adverse selection models and sociological models.  
9  See the analyses by Holmstrom (1982), Holmstrom und Milgrom (1990) und Varian (1990). 
Radner (1986) shows, that in repeated games under certain conditions the free-rider problem 
can be eliminated even if the players cannot observe other players’ actions or information, but 
can only observe the resulting consequences. 
10        Within  this  framework,  we  assume  that  every  group  member  can  verify  the  effort  of  the  
others, but the firm owner cannot do this. It should also be emphasized, that the shirking or 
over motivated members are punished. However, this punishment is a utility loss and not an 
income loss, where the utility loss can be interpreted as mental harassment or social 
exclusion. 
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The worker’s problem is to choose the level of individual effort to maximize its 
utility. For simplicity of analysis, suppose that observation of team member is 
costless and that the group norm is not affected by the individual effort. In what 
follows 0
~
??
?
e
e .11 Thus the optimal individual provided effort level results from 
individual utility maximization of (5a) with respect to effort, which yields the first-
order condition12 
 
? ? ? ?eee
L
v ee ???? ? ~21/1* ??
? .                                                           (6) 
 
Since we focus on individual effort determination, the effect on employment will be 
not taken into account. Therefore, ee F? ?  holds. Using our production function, 
and ?
?
?
H
i
ieL
e
1
1 , which leads to 
Le
e
i
1??
? , we obtain ? ? 1????? ?eee MLeeFF . 
Inserting the labour, equation (3), we find for the individual effect on profit 
ewF? ee /?? . Since we also assume Nash-behaviour, where every worker takes 
the effort of the others as given, the individual chooses an effort level equal to the 
group norm. However, every group member faces the same calculus, which means 
that the group norm corresponds to the average effort level. Assuming 
homogeneous workers, the average effort level equals individual effort and thus 
effort level which would be chosen without any peer pressure. Finally, we have 
eee ?? ~ . Using this, we get from solving equation (6) the effort function   
   
     
?? ?
?
??
?
? ???
L
wee .                                                      (7) 
 
Therefore, the optimal effort by the representative worker is influenced by the 
income parts, but outsourcing will have no direct effect.  
                                               
11  In our framework we assume Nash behavior, where every worker chooses his/her effort 
taking the effort of others as given. So there is no effect of effort provision by the other 
workers and thus no effect on the social norm. See also Lin et al. (2002). 
12        The index i  has been dropped for notational convenience. 
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Since changes in wage and profit income affect all workers, every single 
worker will adjust its effort and thus the average effort will change. These effects 
we derive by taking the differential of effort function (7), which gives   
? ?
? ? 011
1 ???
??
w
e
dw
ed
w
w
?
??  and ? ? 011 ???? ??
?
?
e
d
ed
w
,  so  that  the  wage  and  profit  
sharing enhance productivity by increasing effort provision and positively affect 
labor demand indirectly, which lies in conformity with empirics.13  
Important for the next analysis is the wage elasticity of effort. In our 
framework we find using the notation  
  1
1 ??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
??
???
w
w
e
w
dw
ed
???
????   as  
2
1
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
? ,                                                 (8) 
so that the elasticity of effort  in terms of wage is only one if  we have the specific 
parameter 2/1??  for the disutility of effort.14 According to (9) the effort elasticity 
increases  (decreases)  if  the  disutility  of  effort  becomes  less  (more)  convex.  Since  
we are interested in the effect of profit sharing if the wage is determined by a labor 
union, we assume 2/1?? . The reason for that assumption is that only in this case 
the wage setting by the labor union would be bindings. The profit sharing elasticity 
of effort is positive, i.e.  ? ? .011 ????? wed
ed
?
??
??
?  
We can now summarize our findings as. 
 
Proposition 1: Profit income and base wage have an individual effort-    
augmenting effect and thus increase productivity and wage elasticity of 
effort depends on the parameter of disutility of effort so that it can be 
smaller, equal to, or higher than one.   
 
In the next cases we concentrate mainly the implications of the case when the wage 
elasticity of effort does not exceed one so that 1?? . 
                                               
13       See e.g. Booth and Frank (1999), Cable and Wilson (1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), 
Kruse (1992), Lynn Hannan (2005) and Wadhwani and Wall (1990).  
14      In  a  dynamic  efficiency wage model  in  the  absence  of  outsourcing  Jellal  and Zenou (2000)  
have received the same result in terms of effort wage elasticity.   
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III.   Wage Formation by Monopoly Labor Union and with 
Strategic Outsourcing and Committed Profit Sharing 
 
Now we analyze the timing structure when the representative firm commits 
to profit sharing before the wage formation by allowing for their effects on labor 
demand and effort determination by taking also outsourcing as given. 
 We analyze the wage formation by the monopoly union (see also Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2004), p. 401-403) by assuming that the union behaves utilitaristic in 
the presence of effort determination. Therefore the objective function of monopoly 
labor  union  is  assumed  to  be  ? ? vLNvLV ??? ,  which  we  can  rewrite  by  using  
equations (6a) and (6b) to maximize the surplus anticipating domestic labor demand 
and effort determination according to 
 
          ? ? ?? ? bNLbegwVMax
w
????? *?? ,                                              (9)  
          s.t.   
e
MewL ?? ??? ?
?
? 11
1
   and 
?? ?
?
??
?
? ???
L
wee , 
 
where b  captures the exogenous minimum income for labor union members N .    
            We get as the first order condition  
 
? ?? ? ? ? 01
*
???
?
??
? ?
?
??
?
? ??????
dw
edgw
L
w
dw
degbw
L
w
dw
dL
w
LVw
?? ,       (10)  
 
where the overall wage effect on the profit includes the direct wage effect and the 
indirect effect via effort, so that ? ? 01 ????? L
dw
d ??  when 1?? .  Using  this  and  
? ?
w
e
dw
edg ?? ??
/1
 as  well  as  the  total  wage elasticity of labor  
 11
? ?
w
w
wL
w
dw
dL
???
??????? ??
????????
1
)1(1  the first-order condition (10) can be 
solved to   
                            
)1(1
)(/1
???
???? ?
???
??? ebw .                                                               (11)                                                          
 
We can see from equation (11) that profit sharing will affect the wage in 
different ways. The first working channel is the direct effect, which one can see in 
the denominator of (11), while the second is an indirect effect via the total wage 
elasticity and via effort, respectively via the wage elasticity of effort.  Starting with 
the direct effect, which is described in the denominator of (11), we see that this one 
can be distinguished into two working channels. The first part of the term )1( ?? ?  
describes the substitution effect. This effect will decrease the base wage, which 
means that a former part of the base wage is substituted by profit income. Since 
wage changes also affect effort provision, there will be in the second part of the 
term in an elasticity channel. Since a higher wage will decrease profit and therefore 
profit income, so that it increases the resulting utility loss for the union respectively 
their member. Due to this increasing effect on the union’s marginal costs, higher 
profit sharing will induce a less aggressive wage setting. 
We now turn to a detailed mathematically analysis between profit sharing 
and wage formation originally in the case when the wage elasticity of effort is 
smaller than one, where the different working channels are demonstrated explicitly. 
By using 
?? ?
?
??
?
? ??
L
we we can rewrite equation (11) as follows 
b
LL
w
??
?
??
? ?????
?
1))11(1()1( ?????
?  and in this case by using 
w
w
???
???? ??
???
1
)1( (see Appendix A) and 
w
w
???
???? ??
??
1
(equation (8)) this gives the 
following wage formation equation  
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             .),,(
)21()21)(1(
)1(
2 bMwAb
LL
w
w
w ????????
??? ?
??????
???                      (11’) 
 
It should be emphasized that the wage is an implicit form as both the numerator and 
denominator in the mark-up factor, ),,( ?wMA , depend on wage w in a non-linear 
way via labor demand and direct wage elasticity of labor demand.    
We now turn to a detailed analysis between profit sharing and wage 
formation in the case when outsourcing is strategic and the wage elasticity of effort 
is smaller than one. By implicit differentiation of (11’) with respect to profit sharing 
and outsourcing gives 
bA
bA
d
dw
w?
?
1
?
?  and bA
bA
dM
dw
w
M
?? 1  and by substituting 
Awb /?  we can characterize these effects on wage formation as   
 
                 
A
wA
A
wA
d
dw
w?
?
1
?
?  and                 
A
wA
A
wA
dM
dw
w
M
?
?
1
                                     (12)                 
 
where 01 ??
A
wAw  under the sufficient, but not necessary, assumptions 0?
dw
d w?  as 
the wage elasticity of effort does not exceed one, i.e. 1??  and 1))11(1( ???
L
??   
(see Appendix B). In terms of profit sharing in Appendix B the first term in 
A
wA? is 
positive under the assumptions 
1
)11(1
?
??
?
??
? ???
L
?? and 2/1?? . Concerning the 
second term the elasticity of labor demand in terms of profit sharing is  1?
Ld
dL ?
?  as 
?
1
*
*
?
Le
M  so  that  under  this  assumption  the  second  term  is  negative  so  that  under  
these assumptions the effect of profit sharing on wage formation is a priori 
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ambiguous. The profit sharing effect on wage formation is ??
A
wA?  in the case 
1??  (see Appendix B), so that  
 
                      ?
1
?
?
?
A
wA
A
wA
d
dw
w
?
?    as     1??                                                       (13a) 
 
The outsourcing effect on the mark-up is 0?
A
wAM  as 1??  (see  Appendix  B)  so  
that 
                         0
1
?
?
?
A
wA
A
wA
dM
dw
w
M
  as 1??                                                       (13b) 
under the sufficient,  but not necessary,  assumption 
1
)11(1
?
??
?
??
? ???
L
?? . Therefore, 
higher outsourcing will lower the wage formation by the monopoly union when 
1?? .  
 
We can summarize our findings as. 
         Proposition 2:  In the presence of strategic outsourcing when the wage 
elasticity of effort is smaller than one higher profit sharing will have an 
ambiguous effect on wage formation when 
1
)11(1
?
??
?
??
? ???
L
?? and when 
profit sharing elasticity of labor demand is smaller than one,  1?
Ld
dL ?
? , 
whereas higher outsourcing decreases wage formation under the 
sufficient, but not necessary assumption  
1
)11(1
?
??
?
??
? ???
L
?? . 
 
The negative relationship in Proposition 2 between low skilled wage and 
outsourcing can be motivated as follows. Higher outsourcing means for given wage 
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level a more elastic low skilled labor demand. Thus the opportunity for the labor 
union to set higher wages falls. To avoid outsourcing and make integrated 
production more attractive, the monopoly union reacts with a decreasing low skilled 
wage.15  
 However, we can analyze the impact of profit sharing on wage for the 
special case 2/1??  so that in this case the elasticity of effort in terms of wage is 
one, i.e. 1?? . In this case, the effects of profit sharing and outsourcing cost can be 
expressed as 
 
           0)1(
2
1
1
)1(
2/11
???
?
?
?
??? Ld
dLw
L
w
dw
dL
Ld
dLw
d
dw ?
??
?
??
? ??
 as 1?
Ld
dL ?
?                   (14) 
 
 where  1
22/1
?
??
?
?
?
Le
M
Le
M
Ld
dL
?
??
? ?
  and  
  
                                0
2
1
12/11
??
?
?
??? L
w
dM
dL
L
w
dw
dL
L
w
dM
dL
dM
dw
??
,                              (15) 
 
where 1??
L
w
dw
dL . 
We can now summarize these special findings as. 
 
Corollary 1: In the presence of strategic outsourcing when the base 
wage elasticity of effort is one  
(a) higher profit sharing will have a negative effect on wage formation  
when profit sharing elasticity of labor demand is smaller than one, and  
                                               
15  This lies in conformity with empirics concerning evidence from various countries, e.g. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Hijzen et al. (2005), Hsieh and Woo (2005), Egger and Egger 
(2006), Geishecker and Görg (2008) and Munch and Skaksen (2009). 
 15
        (b) higher outsourcing will decrease wage formation. 
    
IV.  Optimal Committed Profit Sharing and Strategic 
Outsourcing 
 
            Concerning the timing structure, presented in Section II, the representative 
firm has been assumed to commit to profit sharing and outsourcing to maximize 
profit subject to domestic labor demand (3), effort determination (7) and wage 
formation (11’) so that  we first analyze optimal committed profit sharing as  
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From (16) we get the first-order condition is ? ? 01 ** ???? ???? , where the indirect 
profit is 211*
2
11 cM
e
wMew ???? ??
?
??
?
?
?
?
?? . Concerning the derivate of the 
indirect profit in terms of profit sharing we have (see Appendix C) 
)()(*
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wd
dwwL ?
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?
?
?
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?
? ?????  so that the optimal committed profit 
sharing in the presence of strategic outsourcing is  
 
 16
                     
??
?
??
? ?????
??
?
? ???
?
?
??
?
? ???
)
2
1(
)1(1
1
1
w
Mec
Le
M
wd
dw
wd
dw
c
?
?
?
???
?
?
???
?
?
?
?
,                  (17) 
 
where the effort elasticity in terms of profit sharing is ? ? 011 ????? wed
ed
?
??
??
?  
and from equation (13b) ?
1
?
?
?
A
wA
A
A
wd
dw
w
?
?
?
?
 as 1??  (see equation (B5) in 
Appendix B). This is an implicit form for profit sharing because both employee 
effort and labor demand will depend on profit sharing in a non-linear way and both 
numerator and denominator depend on outsourcing.  
Comparative statics of (17) in terms of outsourcing and wage formation is 
ambiguous on committed profit sharing related to wage formation. If the first-order 
condition for committed profit sharing works correctly, then 
)()(*
wd
dwwL
ed
ed
wd
dwwL ?
???
?
?
?
???
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? ?????  so that in this case according to 
? ? 01 ** ???? ????  profit sharing is positive so that  10 ?? c?  holds.   
By differentiating the indirect profit 211*
2
11 cM
e
wMew ???? ??
?
??
?
?
?
?
??  in 
terms of outsourcing M  gives (see Appendix C)     
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1?? . Flexible outsourcing, which is determined after wage setting, is determined 
by 0* ??? cM
e
w
M? . According to (18) strategic outsourcing is higher than 
flexible outsourcing if the wage elasticity of effort  ?   is smaller than one.16       
           
We can now summarize these findings as. 
 
Proposition 3: For individual effort provision, the firm will optimally 
implement a committed profit sharing scheme and strategic outsourcing 
is higher than flexible outsourcing when wage elasticity of effort is 
smaller than one. 
 
Koskela and König (2009) have analyzed committed profit sharing in the case of 
labour union determination of wage and effort and by showing a constant effort 
level will result so that in this case firm’s optimal choice of profit sharing is zero. 
The difference between both approaches is that now the firm will induce higher 
productivity with the implementation of profit sharing, while this does not happen 
in Koskela and König (2009). Therefore the firm will not lose due to profit sharing. 
This result shows that the time structure with individual effort determination will 
generate an alternative compensation scheme with profit sharing, while in the 
presence  of  union  effort  determination  such  a  scheme  would  optimally  not  be  
implemented. 
 Finally, we can analyze both committed profit sharing and strategic 
outsourcing for the special case 2/1??  so that in this case as we have already 
mentioned the elasticity of effort in terms of wage is one, i.e. 1?? . In this case, the 
strategic outsourcing (18) can be expressed as  
 
                                               
16  In the absence of outsourcing Koskela and Stenbacka (2006) have also studied the differences 
between committed profit sharing and flexible profit sharing, which is decided after wage 
formation. They have shown that the optimal profit share under commitment is higher than 
under flexibility because through a profit share commitment the firms can induce wage 
moderation.   
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which is similar as in the case of flexible outsourcing when the elasticity of effort in 
terms of wage is only one, 1?? . 
Concerning the optimal committed profit sharing in the presence of strategic 
outsourcing equation (17) can be simplified by using  
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where the effort elasticity in terms of profit sharing is 0
1
1
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                                                                                                                                 (21) 
 
By using (21) the relationship between committed profit sharing and strategic 
outsourcing is negative, 0
2/11
?
??? ??
?
dM
d c , because 
0
)(
)(
)( 2
2/1
?
?
?
? Le
dM
dLeMLe
Le
M
dM
d
?
?  so that outsourcing cost will have a positive 
effect on committed profit sharing,   0
2/11
?
??? ??
?
dc
d c . 
                                             
We can now summarize these findings as. 
 
Corollary 2: For individual effort provision, when the elasticity of 
effort in terms of wage is only one, 1??   
(a) optimal committed outsourcing is the same as in the case of   
flexible outsourcing and  
(b) higher (lower) outsourcing due to lower (higher) outsourcing cost 
will have a negative (positive) effect of the firm committed profit 
sharing.  
  
V.  Conclusions 
 
  We have analyzed the following questions associated with strategic 
outsourcing and committed profit sharing under imperfect domestic labor market in 
the  case  when profit  sharing  affects  effort.  First,  what  is  the  relationship  between 
wage formation, profit sharing and outsourcing under strategic outsourcing? 
Second, will the firm implement the strategic profit sharing scheme if homogenous 
workers decide individually about effort provision? Third, are the determinants of 
committed profit sharing decided before wage formation relative to flexible 
outsourcing decided after wage formation?   
 20
  We  have  shown  that  profit  income  and  wage  have  an  individual  effort-
augmenting effect and thus increase productivity and wage elasticity of effort  
depends on the parameter of disutility of effort so that it can be smaller, equal to, or 
higher than one.  Moreover, in the case of wage elasticity of effort being smaller 
than one, higher wage and higher outsourcing will increase the total wage elasticity 
of labor demand, while higher profit sharing will decrease the total wage elasticity 
of labor demand. In the presence of strategic outsourcing when the wage elasticity 
of effort is smaller than one, higher outsourcing decreases wage formation, whereas 
higher profit sharing will have an ambiguous effect on wage formation and when 
profit sharing elasticity of labor demand is smaller than one. When the wage 
elasticity of effort is one, higher outsourcing decreases wage formation, whereas 
higher profit sharing will have a negative effect on wage formation when profit 
sharing elasticity of labor demand is smaller than one. For individual effort 
provision, the firm optimally implements a committed profit sharing scheme and 
strategic outsourcing is higher than flexible outsourcing when wage elasticity of 
effort is smaller than one.  
  Finally  when  the  elasticity  of  effort  in  terms  of  wage  is  only  one  optimal  
committed outsourcing is the same as in the case of flexible outsourcing and higher 
(lower) outsourcing due to lower (higher) outsourcing cost will have a negative 
(positive) effect of the firm committed profit sharing.  
  In our analysis we have focused on configurations where labor unions are 
organized by the representative industry. An interesting topic for future research 
would be to embed our approach within a framework, where wages are determined 
through negotiations between labor unions and firms. Even though such an 
extension might seem obvious at first thought, it would add tremendously to the 
analytical complexity of the analysis.  
 
Appendix A: Calculations of the total and direct own wage 
elasticities in terms of wage, outsourcing cost and 
profit sharing 
 
In our framework, the base wage w  affects labor demand in two different ways and 
thus we can separate the elasticity in an direct labor demand effect and an indirect 
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labor demand effect via effort as follows: 
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ed , so that we can 
rewrite the total wage elasticity by using the wage elasticity of effort as follows 
 
? ?
w
w
wL
w
dw
dL
???
??????? ??
????????
1
)1(1 .                            (A1) 
which is a negative function of wage elasticity of effort 
e
w
dw
ed?? . The special 
assumption 2/1??  gives 1?? . The total wage elasticity can be presented in 
terms of direct wage elasticity as   
                           0
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1?? ,                                          (A2) 
so that there is the positive relationship between the total wage elasticity and the 
direct  own wage elasticity in the case 2/1?? .   
          As given outsourcing the effect of wage rate on the direct own wage elasticity 
(using equation (4a)) can be expressed as 
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Thus  under  the  assumption  that  the  wage  elasticity  of  effort  is  smaller  than  one,  
higher wage will increase the direct own wage elasticity so that in this case it will 
also increase the total wage elasticity of labor demand according to equation (A2). 
         The  effect  of  outsourcing  on  the  direct  own  wage  elasticity  (using  equation  
(4a)) can be expressed as 
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2 ???????
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? ?
?? LeLe
M
LeLe
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d ww ?
??
? .                         (A4) 
Higher outsourcing will increase the direct own wage elasticity and in the case of 
2/1??  so  that  in  this  case  it  will  also  increase  the  total  wage  elasticity  of  labor  
demand (15).17  
         Finally, as given outsourcing the effect of profit sharing on the direct own 
wage elasticity (using equation (4a)) can be expressed as 
 
                                               
17        This lies in conformity with empirics, see e.g. Hasan et al. (2007)  and Slaughter (2001). 
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According to this higher profit sharing will decrease the direct own wage 
elasticity.18 Therefore, in terms of total wage elasticity of labor demand when wage 
elasticity  of  effort  being  smaller  than  one,  1?? , higher wage and higher 
outsourcing will increase the total wage elasticity of labor demand 
,0?
dw
d? 0, ?
dM
d? , while higher profit sharing will decrease the total wage 
elasticity of labor demand 0??
?
d
d .QED. 
 
Appendix B: Derivations of the relationships between outsourcing, 
profit sharing and wage formation  
 
We find that the effect of wage on the mark-up can be expressed by using 
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Using (B2) and 0)1(
)1( *
*
???? w
w
Le
Mw
dw
d ???
? we can re-express (B1) as 
                                               
18        Calculations of equations (A3)-(A5) are available upon request.  
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under the sufficient, but not necessary, assumption  0?
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where the first term is positive under the assumption 
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)11(1
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our assumption that 2/1?? . Concerning the second term and using 
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w ??? ??  , the elasticity of labor demand in terms of profit sharing is  
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the second term is negative so that under these assumptions the effect of profit 
sharing on wage formation is a priori ambiguous, ???d
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Finally, the effect of outsourcing on the mark-up can be expressed by using 
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Using these derivations (B6) can be written as  
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Appendix C: Effects of profit sharing and outsourcing on indirect 
profit 
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By using (C1) and 211*
2
11 cM
e
wMew ???? ??
?
??
?
?
?
?
??  the first-order condition 
? ? 01 ** ???? ????  can be written as equation (17).  QED. 
 
Appendix D: Optimal Outsourcing   
 
The first-order condition in terms of outsourcing is  
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